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This paper was prepared for the monetary and fiscal policy conference of September 19-
20, 2002 at the University of Cambridge.  An earlier version was presented at the Bank of 
Japan on March 19, 2002.  I am indebted to George Evans, Seppo Honkapohja, Andrew 
Levin, Edward Nelson, Charles Nolan, Simon Wren-Lewis, and two referees for 
comments and suggestions.  
1. Introduction 
  During the past several years, a striking body of literature has appeared in which 
it is argued that general price level determination is essentially a fiscal, rather than 
monetary, phenomenon.  The most prominent papers have been those of Woodford 
(1994, 1995, 2001), Sims (1994, 1997), Leeper (1991), and Cochrane (1998, 2000), but 
there are several others of significance.
1  If the theory expounded in these papers was 
valid in actuality, there would be major implications for the manner in which fiscal and 
monetary policies should be conducted, not only in individual economies but also within 
monetary unions.
2 The purpose of the present paper is to describe this theory and provide 
one major reason why I believe that it is not relevant to actual economies, but instead is 
basically misleading.  That position has been put forth in McCallum (2001a), but the 
present argument includes a new, different, and more satisfactory justification.  In 
addition, the basic exposition is simplified here and several extensions are developed. 
  At the outset it should be emphasized just how drastically unorthodox or counter- 
traditional the fiscal theory of price level determination is.
3  Specifically, it does not 
merely suggest that fiscal as well as monetary policy stances are significant for price 
level behavior; instead it features a case in which only fiscal policy is relevant.  In the 
prototype analysis presented below, the price level moves over time in a manner that 
mimics the path of government bonds outstanding and is entirely unlike the path of the 
stock of high-powered money.  Accordingly, it is clearly not the case that the argument 
                                                 
1 An incomplete list would include Carlstorm and Fuerst (2000), Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000), 
Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999), and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2000).  Some of these are not entirely 
supportive of the fiscal theory, whereas Buiter (1998, 1999, 2002) is entirely non-supportive. 
2 On this matter, see Bergin (2000), Dupor (2000), and Sims (1997). 
3 In what follows, I shall for brevity often refer to the latter as the “fiscal” or “fiscalist” theory. 
  1 involves fiscal behavior that drives an accommodative monetary authority, as when rapid 
base money growth is adopted to finance a fiscal deficit.
4  Indeed, it is this drastic aspect 
of the fiscal theory that has made it a subject of great interest.
5  In this regard, an 
important point is that the type of model typically utilized in the literature’s analysis is 
not of the overlapping generations type, in which the Ricardian equivalence proposition 
is known to fail—implying that tax changes will affect price level behavior.  Instead, the 
model is basically of the Sidrauski-Brock type, in which Ricardian equivalence results 
are normally obtained, i.e., results implying that bond-financed tax changes have no 
effect on the price level or other macroeconomic variables of primary interest.
6  In such a 
setting, fiscalist positions are truly startling. 
2. Basic Formulation 
  As a background for illustrating these drastic results, let us begin with an 
orthodox analysis of price level determination in an extremely simple and transparent 
setting.
7  Suppose that the (per capita) money demand function for a closed economy is of 
the textbook form 
(1) mt – pt = c0 + c1yt + c2Rt + vt     c 1 > 0, c2 < 0, 
where mt, pt, and yt are logs of the (base) money stock, price level, and output (income) 
for period t, while Rt denotes a one-period nominal interest rate.  The disturbance vt is 
taken for simplicity to be white noise.  It is well known that there are rigorous dynamic 
general equilibrium models with optimizing agents that will justify (1) as a linear 
                                                 
4 Thus the theory is fundamentally different from that of Sargent and Wallace (1981). 
5 Woodford (1995, pp. 25-26), too, has emphasized the importance of cases in which monetary and fiscal 
impulses diverge so that “it is possible to see which is truly determinative.”   Also see Buiter (1999) and 
Cochrane (1998).  Important points about the nature of traditional or monetarist views are made by Nelson 
(2003) while notable attempts to distinguish empirically are made by Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001) 
and Janssen, Nolan, and Thomas (2002). 
6 For an analysis based on this Ricardian model, see McCallum (1984). 
  2 approximation to a combination of implied Euler equations (first-order optimality 
conditions).
8  The present exposition is intended to convey the essential features of a full 
optimizing analysis while ignoring some of the details.
9 
  Furthermore, let us assume that the economy is one in which output and the real 
rate of interest are constant over time.  Then (1) collapses to  
(2) mt – pt = γ + α (Etpt+1 – pt) + vt     α = c2, 
which is the familiar Cagan specification for money demand.  And let us for now 
consider cases in which the growth rate of the (base) money stock is kept constant by the 
central bank, so that 
(3) mt = mt-1 + µ, 
where µ is the growth rate of the money stock.  These relations plus rational expectations 
determine the behavior of pt and mt for time periods t = 1, 2, ….  It is possible that the 
structure was different prior to period 1. 
  In this setting, the orthodox bubble-free or “fundamentals” rational expectations 
(RE) solution for pt can be found by conjecturing that it is of the form 
(4) pt = φ0 + φ1mt-1 + φ2vt, 
since mt-1 and vt are evidently the system’s only state variables.  In that case we have 
Etpt+1 = φ0 + φ1(mt-1 + µ) so substitution of the latter, (3), and (4) into (2) yields 
 (5)  mt-1 + µ = γ + α [φ0 + φ1(mt-1 + µ)] + (1-α) [φ0 + φ1mt-1 + φ2vt] + vt. 
The latter implies that for (4) to be a solution, i.e., to hold for all realizations of vt and 
mt-1, we must have satisfaction of the undetermined-coefficient (UC) conditions 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 This section is adapted from McCallum (1999c). 
8 See, for example, Woodford (1995, 2001), Sims (1994), McCallum (1999a, 2001a), and Kocherlakota and 
Phelan (1999). 
  3 (6) 1  =  αφ1 + (1−α) φ1 
  0 = (1−α) φ2 + 1. 
  µ = γ + αφ1µ + (1−α) φ0 + αφ0. 
Thus we have that φ1 = 1, φ2 = − 1/(1−α) and φ0 = µ − γ − αµ, i.e., that the solution is 
 
(7) pt = µ(1-α) − γ + mt-1 – [1/(1−α)]vt = mt – (γ + αµ) – [1/(1−α)]vt. 
 
Here we see that pt grows one-for-one with mt, i.e., the price level Pt moves on average in 
proportion to the money stock Mt, but fluctuates relative to this average position in 
response to realizations of vt. Specifically, pt is temporarily reduced by positive money 
demand shocks (vt > 0) or boosted by negative shocks (vt < 0).  This is clearly an entirely 
traditional—one might even say “monetarist”—analysis of price level behavior in the 
economy in question. 
  For an even simpler special case, let us next suppose that the money growth rate is 
zero, i.e., that µ = 0 so that mt = m.  Then the solution for pt is  
(8) pt = m − γ − vt/(1−α). 
Thus, if money demand shocks were absent we would have pt = m − γ. 
  It must be noted, however, that while (7) and its special case (8) give the well-
behaved, orthodox, bubble-free RE solutions for this model, there are other expressions 
as well that satisfy the model (2)(3) with RE.  For simplicity, let us consider the special 
case with constant mt = m, but now conjecture a solution of the form 
(9) pt = ψ0 + ψ1 pt-1 + ψ2vt + ψ3vt-1, 
instead of pt = φ0 + φ2vt.  Then working through the same type of analysis as before, one 
finds that the UC conditions analogous to (6) are 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 Very recently, Evans and Honkapohja (2002b) have conducted a similar analysis in a fully optimizing 
  4 (10) 0  =  α ψ1
2 + (1−α) ψ1 
 0  =  α ψ1 ψ2 + α ψ3 + (1−α) ψ2 + 1 
 0  =  α ψ1 ψ3 + (1−α) ψ3 
 m  =  γ + α ψ0 + α ψ1 ψ0 + (1−α) ψ0. 
By inspection, therefore, we see that the first of these has two roots ψ1
(1) = 0 and ψ1
(2) = 
(α−1)/α.  If the former is the relevant root, then we find that ψ3 = 0, ψ2 = −1/(1−α), and 
ψ0 = m − γ so that the same solution as in (8) is obtained.  But if ψ1
(2) is relevant, then ψ3 
= −1/α and ψ0 = (m − γ)/α while any value of ψ2 is possible.  So an infinity of solution 
paths is in this case consistent with the model.  Note, moreover, that ψ1
(2) = (α−1)/α > 
1.0, so most of these solution paths are explosive.  One such path is illustrated in Figure 
1, where the random component is suppressed. 
  Of course there are other variables and conditions besides those discussed thus far 
in a fully articulated model of the economy under consideration.  In particular, let Bt+1 
denote the quantity of one-period government bonds purchased in t, with each bond 
purchased at the price 1/(1+Rt) and redeemed in t+1 for one unit of money.  Then it is 
typically true that a fully-specified optimizing analysis would require that  
(11) lim  Et β
j (Mt+j + Bt+j) /Pt+j  = 0, 
   j→∞ 
i.e., that a transversality condition pertaining to real financial wealth must be satisfied.  
Here β is a typical agent’s discount factor, β = 1/(1+ρ), with ρ > 0 so that 0 < β < 1.  
  We are now at last prepared to turn to the fiscalist theory.  With government 
                                                                                                                                                 
setup.  Their basic result agrees with the one reported here; additional results of theirs are mentioned below. 
  5 bonds recognized, we can write the consolidated
10 government budget constraint (GBC) 
in per capita terms as 
(12) Pt (gt – txt) = Mt+1 – Mt + (1 + Rt)
-1 Bt+1 – Bt, 
where gt and txt are real government purchases and (lump sum) tax collections, 
respectively.  In real terms, this constraint could then be expressed as 
(13) gt – txt = (Mt+1 – Mt)/Pt + (1 + Rt)
-1 (Pt+1/Pt) bt+1 − bt,  
where bt = Bt/Pt.  The reader should note the mixed notation being utilized: bt = Bt/Pt 
whereas mt = log Mt and pt = log Pt.  Condition (13) obtains for t = 1, 2, …. 
  Now consider the special case of the economy discussed above in which Mt and 
thus mt are constant.  Also let the random shock vt be absent so that Pt+1 is correctly 
anticipated in t and suppose that fiscal policy aims for a constant surplus txt − gt = s > 0 
with gt = g.  Then with the real rate of interest on bonds rt defined by 1 + rt = (1 + Rt)/(1 + 
πt), where πt = (Pt+1 – Pt)/Pt, and with rt = ρ, as would be implied by optimizing behavior 
in the absence of shocks,
11 the government budget constraint becomes 
(14) bt+1 = (1 + ρ) bt + (1 + ρ) (gt – txt)                                t = 1,2,…. 
But since 1 + ρ > 1.0, if gt – txt is constant the last equation reveals a strong tendency for 
bt to explode as time passes.  As t grows without limit, bt approaches growth at the rate ρ, 
i.e., behaves like (1+ρ)
t.  Thus the transversality condition (11) tends  to be violated since 
growth of bt  just offsets the shrinkage of β
t = 1/(1 + ρ)
t, yielding a limit that is a positive 
constant. 
  In fact, in this case there are just two paths for bt that, with gt – tx constant, will 
satisfy (14) and also (9)(10)(11) for t = 1,2,….  One of these obtains if the value b1 equals 
                                                 
10  The government consists of a fiscal authority and a central bank.    
  6 –(1 + ρ) (g – tx)/ρ, for then (14) implies that 
(15) b2 = (1 + ρ) [−(1 + ρ) (g − tx)/ρ] + (1 + ρ) (g – tx) 
               = (1 + ρ) (g – tx) [−(1+ρ)/ρ + 1] = −(1 + ρ) (g – tx) /ρ 
and that same value prevails in all succeeding periods.  But b1 = B1/P1, and B1 is the 
number of nominal government bonds outstanding at the beginning of the initial period,   
t = 1.  Thus if the price level in this first period, P1, adjusts to equal the value P1 =  
B1ρ/(1 + ρ) (tx – g), then condition (11) as well as (14) will be satisfied.  Indeed, this is 
precisely what the fiscalist theory predicts: that P1 adjusts relative to B1 and tx – g > 0 so 
as to satisfy the individual agents’ optimality condition (11).
12 
  But what about the necessary condition for money holdings, equation (2)?  Here 
the fiscalist answer is that although the path just described will not conform to the pt =   
m − γ fundamentals solution implied by (8), it can and will satisfy the alternative solution 
pt = [(α − 1)/α]pt-1 + (m − γ)/α for all t = 2,3,….
13  The price level P1, and thus p1, is 
determined by B1 and the value of b1 necessary to satisfy (11), with subsequent Pt and pt 
values being given by (9) with ψ1 = (α − 1)/α.  The price level explodes as time passes, 
despite the constant value of Mt, but all of the model’s equilibrium conditions including 
RE are satisfied nevertheless.  Since Pt and Bt are growing at the same (explosive) rate, 
while Mt is constant, the outcome is rightfully regarded as highly “fiscalist.”
14 
                                                                                                                                                 
11    See, e.g., McCallum (1999a, 2001a), Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999), or Woodford (1995). 
12 Note that with bt constant but positive, the government’s real revenues from bond sales are negative  
(−bρ/(1+ρ)). 
13   It might be asked why this relation does not determine p1 in relation to p0.  Apparently the answer is 
that, in the full stochastic model, it determines the value of ψ2 in (9). 
14  There is a serious problem, however, with this solution if B1 is such that the implied value of P1 is 
smaller than P* = Me
−γ.  In this case the fiscalist equilibrium does not exist because Pt approaches 0 leading 
to violation of the transversality condition (11). Also, if tx – g < 0, then a negative price level would be 
required for satisfaction of  (14) by the assumed value of b1.  This problem is stressed by Buiter (1998, p. 
20). 
  7   Now let us consider the one other path of bt that will, with g – tx constant, satisfy 
the TC (11) as well as (9), (10), and (14).  It is that bt+1 = 0 for all t = 1, 2 ,….  Clearly, 
(11) will be satisfied with Bt+1 = 0 and in that case places no constraint on Pt values.  
Thus these are free to obey pt = m − γ, as in the special case of (9)-(10) given by (8).  
Therefore this solution is the orthodox or monetarist solution. 
  It might be asked how the GBC (14) can be satisfied with this solution, i.e., with 
Bt+1 = 0 for t = 1, 2, … and txt − g > 0.  The explanation is as follows.  In a market 
economy, it is not legitimate to specify fiscal policy as controlling both gt and txt (with an 
Mt  path given) because such a policy could imply that bonds sold to the private sector 
are greater than the demand for them. Thus we need to distinguish between bond supply 
B
S
t+1 and bond demand B
D
t+1, and policy is appropriately specified in terms of Mt, gt, and 
B
S




t+1.  In the case at hand, the 
planned value of txt − g > 0 reflects B
S
t+1 plans, whereas the realized values involve Bt+1 
= B
D
t+1 = 0 and txt − g = 0.  The tx – g values realized are smaller than planned because 
real revenues from bond sales are larger—zero, rather than the planned negative value 
(which is −ρb1/(1 + ρ)).  It is not surprising that some such adjustment is needed since the 
experiment at hand has monetary (Mt) and fiscal (gt and B
S
t+1) policies being set 
independently and exogenously.  The monetarist and fiscalist solutions reflect two 
different ways by which these potentially conflicting policies can be reconciled.
 15 
  In sum, we end up with two RE solutions that represent two competing 
hypotheses regarding price level behavior in the hypothetical economy under study.  It is 
                                                 
15  For more discussion of this topic, see McCallum (2001a).  For an alternative formalization, see 
Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999).  A somewhat different and perhaps more extreme position is that of 
  8 an economy in which the money stock is constant over time, all behavioral relations are 
constant, and there are no stochastic disturbances impinging upon its agents or productive 
processes.  According to the monetarist hypothesis, the price level is constant through 
time at a value that is proportional to the magnitude of the money stock, and no 
government bonds are purchased by private agents.
16  By contrast, the fiscalist hypothesis 
implies that, despite a constant money stock, the bond stock and the price level both 
explode as time passes—but without violating any optimality condition for private 
agents.  This happens because the initial price level adjusts relative to the initial bond 
stock so as to make the real bond stock equal the single non-zero value that will permit 
the stock of real bonds to remain constant and the transversality condition (11) to be 
satisfied.  Under this latter hypothesis, the initial price level is proportional to the initial 
bond stock and the price level grows in tandem with the bond stock. 
  The crucial issue is, which of the two solutions provides the better guide to 
reality, i.e., to price level behavior in actual economies?  In previous writings (McCallum 
1999a, 2001a) I have emphasized that the traditional equilibrium is the “fundamentals” or 
“bubble-free” solution provided by the minimum-state-variable (MSV) solution concept 
for RE models, whereas the fiscalist solution represents a bubble solution.
17  I have 
suggested that this is a plausible reason—in addition to the empirical evidence—for 
preferring the former, but it must be recognized that for many analysts that argument may 
not be persuasive.
18  Accordingly, the next section of the present paper will develop a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Buiter (1998, p. 17), who argues that the fiscalist assumptions “violate the normal rules for constructing a 
well-posed general equilibrium model.”   
16   This does not imply that none are offered for sale by the government. 
17 The MSV solution concept is extensively discussed by McCallum (1999b).  It is crucial to recognize that 
in linear models the MSV solution is, by definition and by construction, unique. 
18 For example, Woodford (2001, p. 701) argues that “what constitutes a ‘bubble equilibrium’ is often in the 
eye of the beholder….” 
  9 more substantive theoretical reason to view the traditional MSV solution as economically 
relevant, and the fiscalist solution as irrelevant.  This reason is based on the intimately-
related concepts of E-stability and least-squares learnability. 
3. E-Stability and Learnability 
  Iterative E-stability was developed in the 1980s, principally by Evans (1985, 
1986), and then modified in response to work by Marcet and Sargent (1989).  Iterative E-
stability involves a thought experiment in which one conceives of expectational behavior 
with anticipated variables such as p
e
t+1 being described by an expression of a form that 
would be appropriate under RE, but with parameter values that are initially incorrect.
19  
This “expectation function” implies, when substituted into the model of the economy, a 
law of motion that entails systematic expectational errors.  So one can then conceive of 
revised values of the parameters of the expectation function that are suggested by the law 
of motion.  These too will imply incorrect forecasts, but one can imagine continuing with 
a series of iterations and consider whether they will converge to a specific RE solution, 
be it the MSV or a non-MSV solution.
20  If such a process converges to a particular 
solution, then the latter is said to be iteratively E-stable. 
  To illustrate the concept of iterative E-stability, let us consider an example that is 
similar to the model of Section 2 with mt = m.  Thus suppose that some unspecified 
variable yt is generated by the structural model 
(16) yt = a0 + a1 Etyt+1 + ut, 
where ut = ξut-1 + εt with ξ< 1 and εt being white noise.  With this specification, the 
usual “fundamentals” RE solution will be of the form 
                                                 
19 Here p
e
t+1 denotes the subjective expectation of pt+1 formed at time t, not necessarily according to RE. 
20 If there is convergence, it will be to some RE solution. 
  10 (17) yt = φ0 +  φ1ut, 
but suppose that agents do not “initially” know the true values of the φj parameters.  If at 
any date t the agents’ prevailing belief is that their values are φ0(n) and φ1(n), then the 
perceived law of motion (PLM) will be
21  
(18) yt = φ0(n) + φ1(n)ut, 
and the implied expectation of yt+1  will be 
(19)  φ0(n) + φ1(n)ξut. 
But using this expression in place of Etyt+1 in (16)—which implies temporarily 
abandoning RE—gives  
(20) yt = a0 + a1[φ0(n) + φ1(n)ξut] +  ut 
as the system’s actual law of motion (ALM).  Now imagine a sequence of iterations from 
the PLM to the ALM.  Writing the left-hand side of (20) in the form (18) for iteration n+1 
gives φ0(n+1) + φ1(n+1)ut = a0 + a1[φ0(n) + φ1(n)ξut] +  ut and therefore implies that  
(21a)  φ0(n+1) = a0 + a1φ0(n) 
(21b)  φ1(n+1) = a1φ1(n)ξ + 1. 
The issue, then, is whether iterations defined by (21) are such that the φj(n) converge to 
the φj values in (17) as n → ∞.  For this simple example, it can be seen by inspection that 
necessary and sufficient conditions for such convergence are |a1 | < 1 and |ξa1 | < 1.  If 
these conditions hold, then the solution (17) is said to be iteratively E-stable.  Evans 
(1986) found that in several prominent and controversial examples the MSV solution is 
iteratively E-stable. 
                                                 
21 Here n is being used to index iterations in an eductive process of learning in meta-time. 
  11 By considering ever smaller “time periods” for iterations of the foregoing type 
one can develop a related process that is continuous in notional time (meta-time).
22  
Evans and Honkapohja (1999, 2001) emphasize this unqualified notion of E-stability 
because it is, under fairly general conditions, equivalent to learnability in actual time by 
means of a least-squares-based adaptive process.
23  Absence of E-stability therefore 
implies that a particular RE solution will not be obtained if agents are not endowed with 
knowledge of the model’s true parameters, but attempt to learn them by statistical 
estimation based on data generated to date, with updating and re-estimation taking place 
each period. Of course this conclusion presumes that the statistical processing at each 
date is of the least-squares type, but that is a distinctly reasonable way for the agents to 
proceed; the general idea is that if this process does not permit agents to acquire 
knowledge of the true parameter values then they are unlikely to do so by other 
processes.  Technical results pertaining to the near-equivalence between E-stability and 
least-squares learnability are described in detail by Evans and Honkapohja (1999, 2001). 
4. Application to Fiscal Theory 
  Here our objective is to develop E-stability results for the model of Section 2 with 
mt = m.  Specifically, we want to determine whether either, or both, of the solutions given 
by equations (9)-(10) features E-stability and thus least-squares learnability.  We can 
make a start by writing the model in question in as 
(22) pt = [α/(α−1)] Etpt+1 + (m−γ)/(1−α) + [1/(α−1)]vt, 
 which is of the same form as that examined in Section 3 with the parameter a1 in (16) 
equal to α/(α−1) and vt = ξvt-1 + white noise.  Therefore, with α < 0 we have 0 < a1 < 1, so 
                                                 
22 Evans (1989) and Evans and Honkapohja (1992) adopted the unqualified concept following results 
described in Marcet and Sargent (1989). 
  12 for any ξ such that | ξ | < 1, the MSV solution based on ψ1
(1) = 0 in (10) is iteratively E-
stable.  That does not establish, however, that solutions based on ψ1
(2) = (α−1)/α, which 
include the fiscal solution, are not E-stable.          
Fortunately, however, this model is a particular version of one case studied by 
Evans (1986), which shows that with 0 < a1 < 1, the MSV solution based on ψ1
(1) is 
recursively E-stable whereas the non-MSV solutions involving ψ1
(2) = (α−1)/α are not 
recursively E-stable (1986, p. 153) under parameter values that include ours.  These 
results were shown also to hold for unqualified E-stability by Evans (1989, pp. 311-312).  
Recently, moreover, a very thorough analysis of that model was provided by Evans and 
Honkapohja (2002a), who consider still more solutions—ones of the “resonant frequency 
sunspot” type.  Their finding is that equilibria reflecting this latter type of phenomena 
will be E-stable only if the coefficient analogous to α/(α−1) in (22) satisfies α/(α−1) < 
−1.  But with α < 0, that is not possible in the model at hand. 
It remains to be settled whether this case is one for which E-stability goes hand in 
hand with least-squares learnability.  The basic result, established by Evans and 
Honkapohja (2001, pp. 231-235), is that E-stable solutions that are dynamically stable 
(i.e., non-explosive) are learnable, whereas E-unstable solutions are not.  Therefore, the 
traditional monetarist solution is, and the fiscalist solution is not, learnable by adaptive 
least-squares procedures in the model of Section 2.  This is the basic result of the present 
paper.
24     
 
                                                                                                                                                 
23 The link is tighter when the solution in question is dynamically stable, i.e., non-explosive. 
24 More recently, Evans and Honkapohja (2002b) have considered the fiscal-theory issue specifically in a 
fully optimizing, nonlinear formulation.  Their conclusion for the basic case corresponding to the one of 
  13 5. Generalization of Basic Result 
  Ignoring stochastic terms, the linear model that we have used to this point can be 
represented graphically as in Figure 1.  There the traditional MSV solution is that pt = p*, 
as at the intersection point, in each period, t = 1, 2, ….  The fiscalist solution, by contrast, 
implies pt values given by paths such as that of the thin line in Figure 1.   Most of the 
literature has, however, utilized explicitly optimizing models that imply an analogous 
diagram as shown in Figure 2, where there is a nonlinear Pt to Pt+1 mapping that has an 
positive but increasing slope.  Such diagrams are featured, for example, by Carlstrom and 
Fuerst (2001), Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999), McCallum (2001a), and Christiano and 
Fitzgerald (2000).  Does the E-stability analysis of the foregoing section carry over to 
specifications such as these? 
  Although there are some qualifications, the answer is basically “yes.”  The main 
point is that E-stability is a local concept, so that conclusions pertaining to the MSV 
solution in Figure 1 carry over to models of the type in Figure 2.  Thus the MSV solution 
is E-stable.  Also, considerable progress toward analysis of non-MSV solutions is 
reported by Evans and Honkapohja (2001, pp. 267-314).  These results are 
predominately, though not entirely, favorable to the notion that non-MSV solutions are 
not learnable.  In any case, the more recent analysis of Evans and Honkapohja (2002b) 
obtains the same result in a nonlinear model, as mentioned in the preceding footnote. 
But other kinds of additional generality are needed, as well.   The model that we 
have used features full price level flexibility and many other simplifications that would 
not be found in reality.  It is of course impossible to generate strict conclusions under 
                                                                                                                                                 
this section is that “the explosive fiscalist price path is unstable under learning”  (2002b,  p.7)—i.e.,  is not 
LS learnable. 
  14 assumptions of great generality, but it would appear that the basic line of argument 
provided above would carry over to almost any model that includes a money demand 
specification of the same general type as (1), where the essential features are that real 
money demand depends positively upon real transactions and negatively upon an 
opportunity-cost variable such as Rt that is the difference between the real rates of return 
on money and other assets.  For in any model that includes such a relationship, the 
behavior of the price level will not depart drastically from that of the money stock except 
along explosive paths.  With non-explosive money supply behavior these will be bubble 
paths—i.e., non-MSV paths.  But the literature on E-stability indicates that the type of 
result found above, that the MSV solution is E-stable and the other solutions are not, 
obtains in virtually all cases involving well-motivated, plausible models.  Evans and 
Honkapohja (1999, 2001) report and emphasize some exceptions, but the main examples 
stem from their (1992) paper.  In McCallum (2002, 2003), I argue that these examples 
reflect implausible economic specifications—models that are not “well formulated.”  It is 
my impression that there is a very strong association in well formulated models between 
E-stability and MSV solutions—which implies that (non-explosive) MSV solutions are 
learnable.  Non-MSV solutions, by contrast, are typically E-unstable and not learnable by 
adaptive least-squares procedures.  
In a very recent paper, Evans and Honkapohja (2002b) have examined a broader 
class of policy regimes, following the specification introduced by Leeper (1991).  In this 
case the monetary authority adjusts a one-period nominal interest rate instrument 
according to a rule of the form 
(23) Rt = µ0 + (1 + µ1)∆pt + θt 
  15 while simultaneously the fiscal authority is holding gt = 0 and implementing a (lump-
sum) tax rule of the form 
(24) txt = τ0 + τ1bt + ζt. 
Leeper (1991) classified monetary policy as “active” if |(1 + µ1)β| > 1 and as “passive” 
otherwise, and classified fiscal policy as active if |β
−1 − τ1| > 1 and passive otherwise.  
Evans and Honkapohja use this terminology, but sensibly focus on cases in which 1 + µ1 
> 0 and τ1> 0.  It seems somewhat unsatisfactory to represent monetary policy in terms of 
an interest rate rule when the purpose of the analysis is to contrast fiscal and monetary 
theories of price-level determination.
25  But let us continue the discussion nevertheless.   
  Using a linearized version of their model, Evans and Honkapohja (2002b) find 
that there are two types of solutions that correspond in several ways to the notion of 
monetarist and fiscalist solutions.  For example, in their monetarist solution the inflation 
rate depends only upon a constant and θt, the current monetary policy shock, whereas the 
fiscalist solution has the inflation rate also depending on the previous period’s real bond 
stock.  For the most part, the monetarist solution is E-stable and LS learnable when 
monetary policy is active and fiscal policy passive, whereas the fiscalist solution is E-
stable and LS learnable when monetary policy is passive and fiscal policy is active.  This 
finding supports the position of Sims (1994) and Leeper (1991) that it is possible for 
fiscal policy-rule settings to influence the behavior of inflation, and in this sense to 
support claims of the fiscal-theory proponents.  But the finding does not overturn the 
arguments given two paragraphs above.  Specifically, when the fiscalist solution is E-
stable and dynamically stable, it involves stable behavior for real money balances and 
  16 therefore implies no major divergence in the time paths of the money stock and the price 
level.  Such solutions evidently represent cases in which monetary policy is 
accommodating fiscal policy requirements and therefore represent outcomes that are fully 
consistent with traditional monetary analysis.  There is a small region of the policy 
parameter space that leads to E-stability with explosive solutions, which would imply 
explosive behavior of real money balances and thus be inconsistent with monetarist 
doctrines.  But these solutions also involve explosive behavior of the real bond stock,
26 
which would seem to imply the failure of transversality conditions that are necessary for 
individual optimality.
27 
From a realistic perspective, emphasis should instead be given to the region in 
which (1 + µ1)β > 1 and ρ < τ1 < 1 + ρ, for the following reasons.  The former condition 
represents the “Taylor principle” in the model at hand,
28 while the latter calls for taxes at 
a rate that would be nonexplosive in the absence of any government revenue from money 
creation and yet not so large as to imply that taxes in a single period would more than 
                                                                                                                                                 
25 This statement does not claim that monetary policy cannot be satisfactorily managed by means of an 
interest rate rule, and certainly does not deny that policy is so conducted by most actual central banks. 
26 In the analysis of Evans and Honkapohja (2002b), the solution equations pertain to ∆pt and bt so both of 
these are explosive. 
27 Woodford (2003) suggests that the Evans and Honkapohja (2002b) designation of monetarist and fiscalist 
solutions does not always correspond to the solution promoted by advocates of the fiscal theory of the price 
level.  In this context, Woodford states that “the central contention” of the fiscal theory is “that under 
certain policy regimes consistency of the inflation rate with intertemporal government solvency should be 
an important factor in determining inflation, in addition to the specification of monetary policy.”  In the 
present paper, however, the essence of the fiscalist position is taken to be a prediction that the price level 
will, under some circumstances, behave like nominal bonds and very differently than the nominal money 
supply.  It is that type of prediction that has made the fiscalist theory striking and prominent.    
28 Considerable discussion of the Taylor Principle is provided by Woodford (2002), who emphasizes that a 
smaller value of µ1 will suffice when µ2 > 0.  In the analysis of Evans and Honkapohja (2002b), 
incidentally, a slightly different condition is found—but it appears that this is merely the result of a log-
linear approximation (used commonly but not by them) that serves to eliminate a β term that should appear 
in the discrete-time version of the Fisher equation. 
  17 fully retire all outstanding government debt.
29  The main result is that, over this entire 
region, the monetarist solution is E-stable (and the fiscalist solution is not).  This result is 
especially interesting in that it indicates that desirable outcomes are provided by 
monetary and fiscal policy rules that are each sensible on their own terms, with no overt 
“coordination” or dependence on the behavior of the other policy authority. 
6. Additional Issue 
  The possibility of price level behavior being dominated by fiscal, rather than 
monetary, policy stances is the hallmark of the fiscal theory.  But there is an additional 
theme in the literature that deserves brief discussion.  This is the occasional appearance 
of an analysis conducted in the context of a model that does not include any asset with 
medium of exchange (MOE) properties, i.e., any money.  Such discussions have been 
provided, for example, by Cochrane (1998, 2001), Weil (2002), and Woodford (2002, 
Ch. 2).   
  The problem with such analyses is that they undermine the very raison d’etre of 
the fiscal theory.  Suppose the model economy has two or more paper assets, one of 
which is called “money” but has no MOE properties—i.e., does not serve to facilitate 
transactions in a resource-conserving manner. Then the model pertains to a non-monetary 
economy, in which case there is nothing surprising or interesting about equilibria in 
which the price level fails to mimic the behavior of this useless and misnamed asset.     
  Alternatively, suppose that the model recognizes only one paper asset issued by 
the government that can be thought of either as “bonds” or “money” as, for example, in 
Weil (2002).  In such settings the behavior of the price level, if it is defined as the asset 
                                                 
29 It seems peculiar that Leeper’s (1991) terminology would classify this type of fiscal behavior—retiring 
each period a positive fraction of outstanding debt—as “passive,” but it does. 
  18 price of goods, will be determined by fiscal policy since the latter governs the creation of 
that paper asset.  But in such a setting there is no distinction between fiscal and monetary 
policy, so again fiscalist results lose their interest; one could just as well describe 
management of that asset’s supply as representing monetary policy.  In short, a necessary 
condition for fiscalist results to be of interest is that they occur in models that include 
both government bonds and MOE money as distinct assets, so that monetary and fiscal 
policies can conceivably push in different directions.
30 
7. Conclusions 
  Let us conclude with a brief recapitulation of the paper’s argument.  Basically, it 
presents a prototype model, in the simplest possible setting, for development and 
discussion of the fiscal theory of the price level.  In this setting, it becomes clear that the 
fiscal theory’s distinctiveness relies upon the analyst’s adoption of a bubble solution, 
rather than the orthodox fundamentals solution, in the context of a multiplicity of rational 
expectations solutions for the model.  It is this step that permits the time path of the price 
level to depart dramatically from the time path of the money stock, despite the model’s 
inclusion of an orthodox money demand function (as is standard in the literature).   To 
determine which equilibrium is plausible, the paper adopts the criterion of adaptive, least-
squares learnability (since individual agents could not plausibly be endowed with perfect 
knowledge of the economy’s true parameter values).  By drawing on results developed in 
the extensive writings of Evans and Honkapohja (1999, 2001, 2002a) it is demonstrated 
                                                 
30 Does this argument deny any importance to analyses designed to analyze price level determination in 
non-monetary economies?  No, but in that context, the meaning of the term “price level” becomes an issue.  
Normally it is the inverse of the exchange value of money, so what is the appropriate definition for an 
economy without any MOE?  It does in fact seem likely that some asset would serve as a common medium 
of account (MOA) in such an economy, although we have little or no recent experience with such matters, 
and a government-issued paper asset would be a natural candidate to fill that role.  But, in any event, 
matters of this type need to be explicitly addressed in such analyses. 
  19 that with the basic policy specification the traditional fundamentals solution is E-stable 
and therefore learnable, whereas the fiscal-theory bubble solution is not.  It is argued that 
similar results are likely to prevail in more complex models that include the same central 
ingredients, including policy rules. 
  With regard to the type of policy specification proposed by Leeper (1991), the 
paper discusses some results obtained recently by Evans and Honkapohja (2002b).  It is 
argued that these results are basically consistent with the message of the paper.  One 
debatable point is that some writers, including Woodford (2003), identify the central 
characteristic of the fiscal theory differently—see footnote 27 above.  Our 
characterization of the fiscal theory, as emphasized above, is that it leads in some cases to 
the prediction of price level paths that are dominated by bond stock behavior and very 
different from the path of the nominal money stock.  It is this notion, I suggest, that has 
been most responsible for attracting attention to the fiscal theory.  
  Finally, the paper argues that analyses of the fiscal theory of the price level must 
be conducted in models with a medium-of-exchange money to avoid undermining the 
raison d’etre of the theory. 
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